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According to a thesis with supporters in a wide range of disciplines – philosophy, psychology, 
theology, literary studies and others – narrative is crucial to human self-understanding and 
self-representation. Many readers of Hannah Arendt view her as an important champion of 
this thesis. For Arendt, they claim, political life can only truly be represented in narrative 
form. When Arendt witnesses the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, however, she 
confronts an individual fatally oblivious to the demands of genuine political action who is 
nonetheless capable of producing stories. In fact, Eichmann is an avid storyteller, who is at 
work on his autobiography. Arendt is therefore forced to conclude that storytelling does not 
necessarily entail any realization of what it means to be a political, i.e. an acting human 
agent. “Eichmann in Jerusalem” contains an implicit theory of the “banality of narrative,” 
the ability of established storytelling templates to block the narrating subject’s recognition of 
the unpredictable interactions of multiple, diverse human beings. When Arendt analyzes 
Eichmann’s obtuse reliance on clichés, she is not speaking only of isolated phrases but of 
entire plots that impose a spurious order on human lives.  
 
 
 According to a thesis with supporters in a wide range of disciplines – philosophy, 
psychology, theology, literary studies and others – narrative is crucial to human self-
understanding and self-representation. The psychologist Jerome Bruner claims that the self is 
best understood as a perpetually rewritten story: “we seem to have no other way of describing 
‘lived time’ save in the form of a narrative,” and “autobiography (formal and informal) should 
be viewed as a set of procedures for ‘life making.’”1 In an article entitled, “The Self as a 
Center of Narrative Gravity,” the philosopher Daniel Dennett asserts that we are all novelists 
who try to “make all of our material cohere into a single good story.”2 Alaisdair MacIntyre, a 
political philosopher, offers a similar vision of the centrality of storytelling to human life and 
argues that narrative history is the fundamental genre for the characterization of actions,3 but 
for him, narrative also mediates between the present and the past of entire societies, because 
as individuals seeking to narrate our own lives, we must always rely on the available “stock of 
stories” that constitutes our common tradition.4 
 Judging by the work of some of her most prominent interpreters, Hannah Arendt also 
champions narrative as the indispensable tool for portraying and understanding human beings 
endowed with the capacity to act. In an essay on Arendt’s belief in the redemptive power of 
narrative, Seyla Benhabib explains that, for Arendt, human actions – and men and women are 
acting beings – “only live in the narratives of those who perform them and the narratives of 
those who understand, interpret, and recall them.”5 Arendt thus believed, Benhabib continues, 
that the theorist of human action, the political philosopher, must become a storyteller.  
 Yet Arendt differs from the thinkers quoted above. Contrary to Dennett and Bruner, 
she does not pay much attention to the stories we tell about ourselves, our autobiographies. 
We are not, she claims in The Human Condition, the sovereign authors of our own stories, for 
life narratives are constituted in encounters among multiple, diverse individuals, none of 
whom ever could or should control and fully shape the process of interaction. In fact, we must 
leave it to others to see, judge, and remember us, that is, embed us in stories. And contrary to 
MacIntyre, Arendt did not believe that narrative activity ties us to traditions because we must 
rely on the “stock of stories” of the world we inherit. Instead, Arendt argued that modern men 
are irredeemably disinherited. Totalitarianism, she claimed, could only emerge outside of the 
bounds of political traditions, and also cannot be grasped by means of any long-established 
and venerable repertoire of concepts and categories. As one commentator writes, 
“totalitarianism does not want its story to be told”. 6 In its desire to eradicate whole groups 
and peoples, this most extreme form of rule condemns its victims to complete oblivion and 
thus in part erases the memory of its doings. Yet Arendt’s vocation as a storyteller only took 
on urgency with the decline of tradition and its established narrative templates. Lisa Jane 
Disch writes that, for Arendt, storytelling is precisely “a way to chart a course of action at a 
time when the thread of tradition is irreparably broken.”7  
 Arendt’s perhaps unorthodox views on who writes the stories of human selves, or 
where we can find patterns for such stories, do not make her less of an advocate for narrative.8 
And my aim in this paper is not to contest this claim about Arendt’s philosophical positions – 
the secondary literature can draw on a wide variety of statements in her corpus. The objective 
is instead to show how Arendt could not effortlessly and persuasively reconcile her emphasis 
on storytelling with her observations of the National Socialist official Adolf Eichmann, on 
trial in Jerusalem. Arendt portrays Eichmann as a person who is not a political agent, or who 
fails to meet the “specifically political demands of the vita activa”.9 Eichmann clearly knows 
how to implement genocidal policies conscientiously and efficiently, but in Arendt’s 
judgment, he is unable to question the legitimacy of the principles according to which he acts, 
unable to realize and assume his responsibility for the actions he performs, and unable to 
register the humanity of his victims. He lacks any sense of moral autonomy as well as an 
ethical responsiveness to others. In other words, he fails to see himself as a distinct person 
among other equally distinct persons. Eichmann does not, however, fail to tell a story about 
his life. In fact, he is an avid storyteller, and by the time he is captured in Argentina, he is at 
work on his autobiography. This means that an individual fatally oblivious to the conditions 
of human agency in Arendt’s sense is still quite capable of producing stories. 
 When in Jerusalem, Arendt, a believer in stories as the only way to capture the life of 
acting human beings, faces a storyteller and an autobiographer who, according to Arendt 
herself, never acted. Insofar as Eichmann tells a story, he is at least on a practical level aware 
of what it means to be a protagonist at the center of some adventure or life, how one thing 
leads to another, and how a course of events begins and comes to an end. In that sense, 
Eichmann clearly grasps the self as a center of narrative gravity and is able to make material 
cohere into a single story. Yet none of this narrative activity leads him to any realization of 
what it means to be a human agent in a sense that would satisfy Arendt’s requirements. On 
the contrary, by stubbornly and obtusely maintaining his own narratives, Eichmann refuses to 
engage with other perspectives on events, and in this way blocks out any intruding 
recognition of other people. As a theorist of what constitutes political action, Arendt may 
need stories, or may claim that political action always issues in stories, but the practice of 
storytelling itself evidently does not put anyone on the track towards understanding and 
appreciating politics. It can even be a way to insulate oneself from politics. This widening gap 
between narrative and politics troubles Arendt, even though she was never a champion of 
autobiography.  
 The question is how Arendt endeavors to save narrativity from Eichmann’s all too 
easy use of stories. What is wrong with Eichmann’s way of telling stories? And what kind of 
story can Arendt herself tell about Eichmann as a person who never acted in her sense of the 
word? What genre or style could adequately capture Eichmann’s remoteness from politics? In 
this paper, I will explore the complex relationship between storytelling and political action by 
looking at (1) Arendt’s theoretical arguments for narrative as a form of representation 
appropriate to political action, (2) her examination of Eichmann as an eager but obtuse, 
inhumane storyteller, and finally, (3) her struggle to demonstrate, by means of irony and 
sarcasm, what kind of insufficient story Eichmann is in fact telling.  
 
 
Arendt’s Argument for Narrative 
Arendt believes that men and women become political agents insofar as they disclose 
their distinctness and uniqueness to others, something that they can only do within the realm 
of the human community. It is only if a community of others exists that disclosure makes 
sense, and it is only in the plurality of a community that a person’s distinctness and 
uniqueness can crystallize. No one is distinct in abstraction from the presence of others. 
Arendt moreover asserts that the principal means of portraying a political agent, an individual 
who discloses himself or herself to others through speech and action, is to put him or her in a 
story. Why this insistence on narrative?  
To be sure, Arendt produced a number of different arguments for the necessity of 
storytelling in the context of politics. Stories, she asserted in a series of essays published in 
the 1960s, bind otherwise disconnected and contingent facts into comprehensible wholes, 
bestow meaning upon overwhelming events, teach acceptance of reality, and, in doing all this, 
allow people to make proper judgments of the past.10 In this context, however, we must focus 
on storytelling as a way of adequately portraying the negotiations of political agents, a thesis 
that Arendt articulates in The Human Condition from 1958. Stories, Arendt claims in this 
book, allow us to focus on one person – the protagonist – while simultaneously embedding 
him or her or in a “web of human relationships”.11 This particular virtue of stories comes 
through in the contrast with static descriptions of character, which possess the quality of a list, 
however vividly and eloquently one presents it. In contrast, stories do not capture 
personalities in a series of propositions about character traits, but in sequences of actions that 
involve encounters and negotiations with others. A life narrative can record the disclosure of a 
person in a way that shows how this disclosure takes place, and could indeed only take place, 
in the medium of “innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions” (HC, 184). To Arendt, 
storytelling is the practice that does justice to the necessarily decentralizing drift of the public 
realm in which action occurs, for even as it revolves around one single protagonist, this 
central character is constantly presented in confrontations and interactions with others rather 
than in isolation. There is no plot without the indication of human plurality.  
Viewing someone as a political individual, and that means an individual whose 
uniqueness and distinctness has become apparent, entails producing a story, for “the living 
essence of the person [. . .] shows itself in the flux of action and speech” (HC, 181). In the 
idiom of The Human Condition, the political agent is a hero, if hero designates less the 
exalted status of a demigod than the willingness to suffer exposure to other people’s 
judgment: “The hero the story discloses needs no heroic qualities; the word ‘hero’ originally, 
that is, in Homer, was no more than a name given each free man who participated in the 
Trojan enterprise, and about whom a story could be told” (HC, 186). Someone who prefers to 
remain anonymous consequently falls outside of the category “hero,” whether this person 
happens to be a secret service agent, a philanthropist, or a burglar, for he or she is slyly, 
modestly or cowardly withdrawing from the realm in which people openly articulate their 
distinct personalities in relation to each other. The retreat from the public realm is also the 
retreat from narrative.  
Any determination of a person in terms of a set of qualities fails to do justice to the 
appearance of an individual in the unpredictable and always changing field of human 
togetherness. As Arendt writes in Men in Dark Times, stories reveal without “committing the 
error of defining”.12 In particular, stories approach people not as isolated, self-enclosed 
figures but as beings who are continually affecting and affected by a “web of human 
relationships” (HC, 184). Given his or her place in a complex of “innumerable, conflicting 
wills and intentions” the subject of the story, the hero, is also never its author or producer. He 
or she displays himself not by his or her capacity to begin and fully control a stable course of 
action to its end, but in the aspect of a doer and a sufferer. Statements provoke responses, 
actions incite counteractions, projects are initiated by one person but completed by the many, 
and individuals in pursuit of glory or gain are thwarted, disturbed, supported or celebrated. 
Telling a story always means including representations of clashes and alliances among human 
beings and storytelling is therefore a means to render tangible the inherent plurality and 
inescapable volatility of human togetherness. 
These reflections from The Human Condition, inspired by the Greek experience of life 
in the polis, may seem far removed from the concerns that should preoccupy a reporter at a 
criminal trial, but elements of her political philosophy reappear in Eichmann in Jerusalem. In 
the first chapter of the report, Arendt explicitly declares her intention to represent the accused 
as a political being, which means to speak of him as a “hero”, a project she signals by 
introducing an analogy between the trial format and traditional drama: “A trial resembles a 
play in that both begin and end with the doer, not with the victim. [. . .] In the center of the 
trial can only be the one who did – in this respect he is like the hero in the play – and if he 
suffers, he must suffer for what he has done.”13 Echoing her words in The Human Condition, 
Arendt enlists the trial procedure in an endeavor to place Eichmann in a political context. She 
argues that the trick of the legal trial is to determine retrospectively the actions of the accused 
and convert him into the “hero” or public “doer” he refused to be by reconstructing, 
publicizing, and judging his deeds. If the supposed criminal previously had wanted to “remain 
outside the pale of human intercourse”, a trial could represent the community’s attempt to 
draw him back into it by making his actions available for assessment (HC, 180).14 This 
attempt to reinsert a person into a public realm and hence to superimpose a political paradigm 
onto a past depends on forging a narrative, or a “limited and well-defined outline of what was 
done and how it was done”, as Arendt remarks in Eichmann in Jerusalem (EJ, 9).  
Within the legal framework, the reconstruction of a narrative is a precondition for 
assigning responsibility to the accused and hence an integral part of the procedure. Narrative, 
then, is a form of describing the world that is both politically and legally necessary.15 It is the 
only way to represent human beings as agents in a world of human plurality, and the only way 
to determine their responsibility for what has transpired. From the perspective of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, politics and law are interconnected, since trials produce narratives about alleged 
criminals even in the cases when they want to escape the public realm, which is the space of 
political action. Trials bring men and women into the public realm, and therefore make their 
existence political, by forming narratives about their deeds. As we shall see, however, the 
Eichmann case put Arendt’s case for narrative to a severe test. Eichmann, it turned out, came 
to Jerusalem equipped with a particular kind of narrative, one that shielded him from the 




To treat Adolf Eichmann as a “hero” means to construct a verifiable narrative about 
his criminal actions. Politically, this would allow an assembled public to witness how 
Eichmann disclosed himself as a distinct and unique person through his interactions with 
multiple speech agents, or, negatively, how he implemented policies designed to eradicate 
human plurality. The legal apparatus in Israel certainly did not lack means to capture the 
chronology of criminal acts as well as the personality profile of the accused; Eichmann was 
subjected to a police examination running for approximately eight months, interviewed by 
“half a dozen psychiatrists” (EJ, 25), and finally cross-examined at length by the defense, 
prosecution, and the judges during the actual trial. With access to this material, Arendt, who 
attended the trial in Jerusalem as a reporter, felt that she could sketch Eichmann’s initial 
social milieu, recapitulate his Nazi career, and describe his role in the bureaucratic machinery 
of genocide. She ended up producing an account of Eichmann’s life, along with a story about 
the proceedings in which that life was being publicly scrutinized. As a commentator has put 
it, Arendt became a “storyteller of the Eichmann trial”.16 
Who does Arendt think that Eichmann is? Eichmann is, to bring together various 
statements in the first chapters of Eichmann in Jerusalem and list character traits, a “déclassé 
son of a solid middle-class family” (EJ, 31), a careerist driven by a distorted sense of idealism 
(EJ, 42), a man who is ignorant (EJ, 41), full of himself (EJ, 46), easily bored (EJ, 35), and 
prone to self-pity (EJ, 50) but who does possess a gift for negotiations and administrative 
organization (EJ, 45). In short, Arendt presents Eichmann as a man with some “common 
vice[s]”, and character flaws (EJ, 47). Yet the character flaw that Arendt deems most 
“decisive” is what she describes as Eichmann’s inability to conceive of other viewpoints (EJ, 
47). This character flaw, if it can be categorized as one, entails nothing less than Eichmann’s 
cancellation of the personhood of others and of his own. Basing her comments mainly on the 
transcripts from the police examination, Arendt asserts that Eichmann’s utterances consist 
almost exclusively of clichés of the Nazi organizations he worked for, and that he empties 
every newly constructed sentence of any significance through subsequent repetitions. This 
perfectly standardized vocabulary cuts Eichmann off from any manifestation of difference, or 
erodes it by reiteration; the “striking consistency” of his speech makes it impossible to 
communicate with Eichman in the sense of articulating together a range of differing but 
interconnected points of view (EJ, 49). He therefore fails to relate to others as members of a 
network of plural beings, each with an individual standpoint on a shared world, and also to 
constitute himself as a unique being among them. His complete submission to a narrow 
linguistic code of stock phrases makes him unable both to express or to perceive “human 
distinctness” insofar as such distinctness becomes manifest in human discourse (HC, 176). 
The question of who Eichmann is should be rendered in the following form: who speaks when 
Eichmann speaks? And in Arendt’s view, Eichmann is not capable of speech. He utters 
sentences that reveal only a “perfect harmony” with a system of clichés and thus does not 
disclose the distinctness of a ‘who’ (EJ, 52). Eichmann is, one could say, only a conduit for a 
jargon and hence never a distinct individual who speaks with others. 
Arendt presents the trial forum as a device with which to bring back a criminal who 
has been outside the pale of human intercourse into the field of others by constructing a story 
of his actions and then also linking his deeds with legally decided consequences. Legal 
procedure is, in her view, enlisted to make up for the absence of genuinely political action, or 
action performed for a public. The trial is supposed to turn the criminal into the hero he never 
was by treating him as a doer-sufferer. Yet unlike the standard criminal who purposely evades 
the public realm or “who must hide himself from it” (HC, 180), Eichmann never had a notion 
of the presence of others who could recognize and judge him. The trial makes Eichmann 
available to the public realm, but what is then revealed is that, on a fundamental level, he as a 
person never moved among and in relation to other acting beings; he never participated in the 
field of human interconnectedness. As a key officer in the genocidal machine of the National 
Socialist state, Eichmann was able to embrace an ideology insofar as it was embodied in an 
arsenal of phrases, but he was not capable of articulating opinions or judgments while 
deliberating with others. He may have shown great facility at executing orders or cooperating 
with apparently like-minded partners, but he could not gauge the resistance that inevitably 
occurs among humans insofar as they possess innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions. 
In the chilling description of his absolute blindness to the existence of different viewpoints, 
Arendt mentions that Eichmann can only remember the Jews who were completely in his 
power and who, in this state of complete subjugation, could not voice any resistance.  
That Eichmann’s mind is completely occupied by jargon turns out to be an effective 
cognitive blockage of any differing viewpoint and hence of the outside world. This blindness 
to others also has effects on the way in which he recalls past events and groups those events 
into coherent stories. The interrogated Eichmann certainly does not resist talk of the past. To 
the contrary, he delights in discussing the course of his own life, and Arendt even reports that 
writing his memoirs was his “favorite pastime” (EJ, 27).  
But the question is what type of story Eichmann produces when telling his own life. 
Predictably, the memoirs or his musings about his life story during the interrogations are not 
veridical. Arendt repeatedly complains about Eichmann’s “unreliable [memory]” (EJ, 53), 
“extraordinarily faulty memory” (EJ, 54), “faulty memory” (EJ, 63 and 80), or “defective 
memory” (EJ, 106). Yet his memory is faulty not because he suffers from amnesia and is 
somehow physically unable to record occurrences, or even because he seeks to edit out 
incriminating episodes, but because he subordinates all the events of his life under the 
elements of a restricted jargon. Eichmann cannot remember any event unless it is 
encapsulated in a formula. This form of remembrance ends up dissolving the sequence in 
which the events and meetings occurred so that they can be reorganized as isolated moments 
around stock phrases.  
Eichmann does display an ability to narrate his life, despite his flawed recollection, 
but only by making this life conform to a convention, by subsuming it, in its entirety, under a 
cliché. Arendt relates how Eichmann talks of his life being ruined again and again by bad 
luck, a complaint that reveals the horrible self-pity of a man who helped implement the 
destruction of a people: “everything he tried on his own invariably went wrong – the final 
blow came when he had ‘to abandon’ his private fortress in Berlin before he could try it out 
against Russian tanks. Nothing but frustration; a hard luck story if there ever was one” (EJ, 
72). The recurring pattern of obstacles of which Eichmann speaks, a pattern under which any 
number of experiences can conveniently be gathered as examples, does not necessarily 
suggest that he encountered a reality that did not agree with the dominant linguistic code. To 
begin with, the hard luck story indicates that his memory functioned only in respect to events 
“which had a direct bearing upon his career”, whether he perceived them as obstacles or as 
triumphs (EJ 62). More importantly, the resistance remains curiously faceless and hence 
signals more than an excessive preoccupation with the steps of a conventional career. 
Eichmann may indeed have failed at getting things done, but the obdurate reality he struggles 
with never indicates to him that his life is populated with other human beings. His constant 
talk of frustration does not point to any confrontation with another person, but rather reveals 
the submission of all his experiences to a clichéd scheme, namely to the pathetic script of the 
“hard luck story”. The possible encounter with someone whose will and intention is at cross-
purposes with Eichmann’s is quickly dissolved into the cheap folk wisdom of inescapable 
futility.17 His ability to narrate his own life does not in any way help him to realize his own 
situatedness in a diverse human community. On the contrary, his storytelling is just another 
way that he refuses the recognition of those around him, or remains oblivious to them.  
For Eichmann, the self is indeed the “center of narrative gravity,” and he makes all his 
recollections cohere into a single story – the hard luck story of endless frustrations – but this 
in no way brings him closer to becoming a person in Arendt’s sense of disclosing a distinct 
personality in the unpredictable flow of human togetherness. Since life stories can be so banal 
as to reveal nothing of the distinctness of a person, the ability to craft an autobiographical 
story does not constitute evidence of personhood.18 The problem with Eichmann is not that he 
is unable to tell his life story and, for this reason, is not a full human person. The problem is 
rather that he already lives his life within quotation marks and can tell his own trite and vapid 
story far too conveniently. Everything that occurs around or with him is always assimilated to 
an already established code, which leaves no space for the unexpected event or the encounter 
that disturbs the calm of obliviousness to others. Listening to and reading Eichmann, Arendt 
comes to realize that Eichmann’s life is already fully narrativized, and that the neatness of this 
narrative is closely related to his blindness to others. For Arendt, then, autobiographical 
competence may be a necessary condition of personhood, but it is far from sufficient.  
 
 
Telling Eichmann’s Story 
 How does Arendt proceed to tell Eichmann’s story, the story of his life, career and 
crimes, given that his own storytelling skills did nothing but cut him off from the plurality of 
other people, compounding his inhumanity? Numerous scholars and critics have analyzed 
Arendt’s peculiar style or abrasive tone in Eichmann in Jerusalem.19 Her sarcastic comments 
on Eichmann, critique of Jewish functionaries for their alleged submissiveness, irritated 
comments on the Israeli court proceedings, and harsh dismissals of the often emotional 
testimonies even constitute major points of contention in commentary on her work. The 
philosopher Gershom Scholem, to name only the most famous example, balked at her 
apparent heartlessness, and accused her of a lack of concern with Jewish suffering.20 In more 
recent years, scholars such as Shoshana Felman have scrutinized how Arendt’s austere focus 
on the requirements of legal prosecution made her disregard the acts of witnessing at the 
trial,21 whereas other commentators have sought to explain her “deliberate irreverence”22 as a 
means to repudiate what she perceived as Ben Gurion’s project to put suffering on display in 
an attempt to fortify Israeli national consciousness.23 In what follows, however, I will discuss 
the stylistic and narrative composition of Arendt’s report, and especially her ironic attitude 
vis-à-vis Eichmann and his phraseology, as her response to the problem of how to portray a 
non-person or non-agent with the means of representation she herself deemed suitable for 
people engaged in genuine speech action, namely narrative.  
Eichmann is a self if by self we mean someone who can tell his life story, who can 
bind events together in novel-like autobiography and in this way maintain a sense of 
coherence and continuity. But he is not a self in Arendt’s sense of a person living in a 
community, in which individuals disclose themselves to each other in action and in speech. 
The absolute dominance of Eichmann’s banal hard luck story in fact screens out any 
interaction he might have had with someone in his surroundings. His relentless narrativization 
of his life does not make Eichmann human but keeps him out of the human community. Since 
Arendt never paid much attention to autobiography, however, and saw narrative as a means to 
portray others, this does not necessarily subvert her own case for narrative as a politically 
relevant art. The fact that Eichmann’s memoir writings and trial stories are horrifyingly banal 
should not stop Arendt from believing that stories are the only way to capture adequately and 
appropriately the life of acting human beings. Yet Eichmann nonetheless puts Arendt’s 
embrace of narrative to a test, for she must ponder the question what a narrative of a non-
acting and non-speaking person should look like. If narrative is needed for the representation 
of political beings, how does one narrate, or perhaps abstain from narrating, the life of an 
utterly and fatally un-political man?  
Arendt recognized the incongruity between dangerously un-political figures on the 
one hand and the “political function of storytelling” on the other as a general problem in the 
age of totalitarianism.24 Writing about the “definitive biography” as a one of the most 
“admirable genres of historiography” in Men in Dark Times, her own collection of personal 
portraits, she called Hitler and Stalin “non-persons” who should in fact not be treated to the 
“undeserved honor” of a biography.25 When composing the Jerusalem trial report, however, 
this conflict between the figure of the (non-)person and genre forced itself upon her in her 
writing. Eichmann’s failure to speak a language other than the one decreed from within the 
organizations he had joined meant that he never disclosed himself as a distinct person among 
other acting human beings. The ensuing lack of contact with human plurality also had to 
affect the narrative effort of someone observing and portraying him, at least if narrative was 
to live up to its promise of providing a form of representation appropriate to political beings.  
Arendt establishes that Eichmann’s life cannot be told as a sequence of encounters 
within a complex “web of human relationships” which must also mean that he can never quite 
become a person “about whom a story could be told.” Yet how does Arendt articulate this 
problem in a report with the features of a story, a narrative chain of events involving a central 
protagonist? If we give credence to Arendt’s attempt to mobilize the trial form as a means to 
portray Eichmann as a hero in the sense of constructing a narrative about him, then his 
complete isolation from others as well as his concomitant lack of individuality must show up 
on the level of the narrative constitution of the report. In writing, Arendt must work out the 
problem of telling the story of a person whose deficiencies distance him from the kind of 
narrative practice that she herself envisaged, a linguistic and cultural practice through which 
the plurality inherent in genuine human togetherness can be rendered tangible. Unlike in the 
case of criminals who merely seek to remain hidden from view but can presumably be 
brought into the orbit of public human interaction, the narrative sequence that results from the 
reconstruction of events at the Jerusalem trial cannot show “his [Eichmann’s] real personality 
against his will” for the reason that he never moved among men and never acquired a 
personality.26  
If Eichmann cannot recount the events of his life beyond offering the “winged words” 
that for him always captured these events(EJ, 48), it is uncertain if Arendt can or is willing to 
step in as the storyteller and narrate the life of someone who, in never entering the realm of 
unpredictable human interaction, also never constituted himself as a distinct person. The 
structure of Eichmann in Jerusalem as a whole is dictated by the course of the trial. It begins 
with a presentation of the initial proceedings and ends with the judgment and execution of the 
accused. This means that the report tracks Eichmann’s life in a largely chronological fashion, 
and the first chapters are devoted to his background, entry into the Nazi party and initial 
career as an expert on the “Jewish question”. The trial thus provides Arendt with a framework 
within which she can reconstruct Eichmann’s biography.  
But even if the resulting sequence of chapters follows the outline of Eichmann’s life, 
Arendt does not produce a story of it in any direct manner, at least not in the sense of trying to 
compensate for his defective memory and suspicious narrative ease by crafting a text that 
relates an array of events with the voice of an outside observer. The point of the account is not 
to tell the story Eichmann refused to provide and thus succeed where Eichmann failed, but 
rather to disrupt his overly smooth narrative and thus in some sense fail where he succeeded. 
But how is this done?  
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt often lifts Eichmann’s agglomeration of clichés 
into her report, and limits her writing to lengthy comments inserted between the chunks of his 
phraseology. It is as if someone who cannot speak without falling back on chains of pre-
articulated sentences also cannot and should not be fully translated into the voice of an 
outside narrator; such an operation would only run the risk of covering over the dead 
linguistic banalities and hence conceal Eichmann’s “fight with the German language” (EJ, 
48). As Arendt stated in a reply to Gershom Scholem’s critical review of her book, she had 
indeed consistently opted for “reporting Eichmann’s own words.”27 But one must add that she 
had done this not despite but precisely because of his “inability to speak” (EJ, 49). It is 
because Eichmann cannot speak or has no words of his “own” that he also cannot be spoken 
for, since that would pull him too far into the realm of articulate subjects. The resulting 
technique of narration is exhibited early on in the book, in the account of Eichmann’s birth, 
which must here be quoted in full:  
  
He [Eichmann] was born on March 19, 1906, in Solingen, a German town in the 
Rhineland famous for its knives, scissors, and surgical instruments. Fifty-four years 
later, indulging in his favorite pastime of writing his memoirs, he described this 
memorable event as follows: ‘Today, fifteen years and a day after May 8, 1945, I 
begin to lead my thoughts back to that nineteenth of March of the year 1906, when at 
five o’clock in the morning I entered life on earth in the aspect of a human being.’ 
(The manuscript has not been released by the Israeli authorities. Harrry Mulisch 
succeeded in studying this autobiography ‘for half an hour,’ and the German-Jewish 
weekly, Der Aufbau was able to publish short excerpts from it.) According to his 
religious beliefs, which had not changed since the Nazi period (in Jerusalem Eichmann 
declared himself to be a Gottgläubiger, the Nazi term for those who had broken with 
Christianity, and he refused to take his oath on the Bible) this event was to be ascribed 
to ‘a higher Bearer of Meaning,’ an entity somehow identical with the ‘movement of 
the universe,’ to which human life itself, in itself devoid of ‘higher meaning,’ is 
subject. (The terminology is quite suggestive. To call God a Höheren Sinnträger 
meant linguistically to give him some place in the military hierarchy, since the Nazis 
had changed the military ‘recipient of orders,’ the Befehlsempfänger, into a ‘bearer of 
orders,’ a Befehlsträger, indicating, as in the ancient ‘bearer of ill tidings,’ the burden 
of responsibility and of importance that weighed supposedly upon those who had to 
execute orders. Moreover, Eichmann, like everyone connected with the Final Solution, 
was officially a ‘bearer of secrets,’ a Geheimnisträger, as well, which as far as self-
importance went certainly was nothing to sneeze at.) But Eichmann, not very 
interested in metaphysics, remained singularly silent on any more intimate relationship 
between the Bearer of Meaning and the bearer of orders, and proceeded to a 
consideration of the other possible cause of his existence, his parents: ‘They would 
hardly have been so overjoyed at the arrival of their first-born had they been able to 
watch how in the hour of my birth the Norn of misfortune, to spite the Norn of good 
fortune, was already spinning threads of grief and sorrow into my life. But a kind, 
impenetrable veil kept my parents from seeing into the future.’ 
The misfortune started soon enough; it started in school. Eichmann’s father, first an 
accountant for the Tramways and Electricity Company in Solingen and after 1913 an 
official of the same corporation in Austria, in Linz, had five children, four sons and a 
daughter, of whom only Adolf, the eldest, it seems, was unable to finish high school, 
or even to graduate from the vocational school for engineering into which he was then 
put. Throughout his life, Eichmann deceived people about his early ‘misfortunes’ by 
hiding behind the more honorable financial misfortunes of his father (EJ, 27-28).  
   
By citing Eichmann’s account of his birth, the passage clearly gestures towards the 
notion of the beginning point of a life as the proper beginning point of a story; the memoir 
rhetoric comes with a conventional epic arrangement and tone. In the quotations, Eichmann 
appears as the generic autobiographical narrator retrieving his own past by retrospection, from 
a position where he can survey and summarize his life. Arendt relates Eichmann’s account of 
his own birth, overloaded as it is with formulaic phrases and figures, in the mode of irony: his 
birth is a “memorable event,” his position “was nothing to sneeze at,” and he is “not very 
much interested in metaphysics.” She does let Eichmann speak but then continually 
comments, corrects, and renders ironic what he says. She inserts numerous parenthetic 
remarks not only to account for sources, but also to make place for asides on the Nazi 
vocabulary, which of course is one of the main sources of Eichmann’s idiom. She picks up 
words he uses (such as “misfortune”) and by writing with and in his vocabulary, proceeds to 
reveal how his story is the hollow account of a vain character. By beginning with Eichmann’s 
birth, Arendt does not deviate from the conventions of storytelling, but rather takes the 
opportunity to expose them sarcastically as conventions. She ends up telling his life, but in 
telling it she also reveals – at every step – his complete reliance on the pompous scripts with 
which he is familiar. Arendt cannot tell another story than the one Eichmann tells, but limits 
herself to interrupting it and exposing its insufficiencies.  
Arendt places importance on narrative because it can portray agents in the “web of 
human relationships”. Stories can illuminate the formation and appearance of subjects in fluid 
relational contexts that disallow the reduction of any one person to a set of traits existing prior 
to and in abstraction from human encounters. The problem worked out in the pages of the 
Jerusalem report is not that Eichmann’s isolation from others makes his life unsusceptible to 
any narrativization, but that this isolation emerges precisely in the easy submission of this life 
to the templates of simplified narratives, such as the trite gestures of memoir writing, the 
“hard luck story” of an honest man who keeps stumbling into obstacles, or the institutionally 
supported narrative of a swift ascent up the career ladder. Again, Eichmann already lives his 
life within quotation marks. In this situation, Arendt’s intervention is to display explicitly the 
quotation marks in between which his life played out. Eichmann’s remoteness from the 
political context of ongoing deliberation and dispute does and must show up on the level of 
the narrative constitution of the report, in the form of a collage of the clichés he regurgitates. 
It is because the accused cannot speak that his words must speak for themselves, 
intermittently accompanied but never erased by the words of the observer and narrator. 
Arendt does not translate what Eichmann says into some other idiom, she does not interpret it, 
give it another form, and thereby cover over its irredeemable banality. Instead, she puts his 
inability to speak into circulation, so that it begins to speak its own inability. Her effort as a 
reporter consists in the re-contextualization and re-exposure of the phrases that she does not 
break up, modify, translate, or replace. By beginning with Eichmann’s birth she does not 
deviate from the conventions of storytelling, but rather sarcastically exposes them as 
conventions. The passage quoted above emerges as a paradigm of Arendt’s method 
throughout the text. Her story of Eichmann’s life comes in the form of an elaborate 
commentary on his uncanny ability to tell a cheap and hackneyed story.  
The specific composition of Arendt’s Jerusalem report, the continual interweaving of 
quotation, ventriloquism, and acerbic commentary that caused so much controversy, is a 
necessary strategy in telling the life of a figure who does not enter the field of human 
togetherness and thus does not become a ‘who’, that is, someone who through the disclosure 
peculiar to actions and speech becomes the subject or hero of a future story. A story in 
Arendt’s sense only becomes possible with an encounter (of which there are none in 
Eichmann’s life), and not through the conformity of a series of events to the already 
established project of a single will. Neither Eichmann nor Arendt can tell a real story of his 
life as constantly crossed by others, and, as a consequence, she tells it or it is told through a 
recurrent exposure of his banal statements in police interviews, cross-examinations, and 
memoirs.  
Eichmann obtusely narrates his life story in total reliance on cliché; Arendt reveals 
this dependence on cliché by recycling his formulas in her text. What separates them is irony. 
Arendt herself pointed to the pervasiveness of irony in Eichmann in Jerusalem in a 
conversation with Günter Gaus: “That the tone of voice is predominantly ironic is completely 
true.”28 But how does irony achieve separation between the one who speaks and the one who 
reports that speech? To speak ironically means to indicate that there can be multiple 
perspectives on a single statement. Since Eichmann cannot even begin to understand that 
different subjects can look at the world from different perspectives, he must be incapable of 
irony. When speaking ironically, Arendt thus stages in one text the diversity of viewpoints 
that Eichmann would never have discerned.29 As Lyndsey Stonebridge writes, Arendt’s 
decision to use irony or “speak double” in Eichmann in Jerusalem involves an “act of 
repetition which extricates the statement from its context, allowing it [. . .] to become 
something else on the lips of the imitator.”30 In her trial report, Arendt moves very close to 
Eichmann’s words and indeed copies them into her account, and yet precisely by doing so she 
simultaneously inserts an unbridgeable distance between his and her way of speaking and 
writing. Arendt can cite another person, understand what that person is seeing and saying, and 





Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem in effect disputes that the capacity to narrate one’s 
life is a sufficient condition for personhood – Eichmann can tell his life story and write his 
autobiography, and even relishes the practice of narration, but he never meets the demands of 
human moral and political life, which involves the recognition of others. For Arendt, the 
encounter with Eichmann demonstrates that autobiography and genuine human “life making” 
(Bruner) are sundered. Yet this insight into how the easily mastered conventions of standard 
life narratives helped Eichmann remain outside the community of responsive human beings 
also puts pressure on Arendt as someone who witnesses Eichmann and wants to tell the story 
of his trial and his life. The banality of Eichmann’s life story with its isolating and 
depoliticizing effect must be put on display rather than being rewritten and improved. 
Paradoxically, Arendt must rely on Eichmann’s words in her account precisely because he did 
not have any words other than circulating phrases, clichés, and hackneyed stories. His limits 
have to be shown rather than covered over. When dealing with Eichmann, irony is, for 
Arendt, not a matter of a (perhaps tactless) stylistic preference, but an absolute necessity.  
According to Benhabib, Disch, and other interpreters, Arendt believed that the 
political theorist must become a storyteller, for acting beings are only truly understood and 
represented when they appear in narratives. To this we must now add that Arendt portrayed 
Eichmann’s remoteness from politics by receding as a storyteller and letting him tell his own 
life narrative. Faced with a non-political man, she at least temporarily vacated her role as a 
storytelling political theorist and limited herself to the practice of critical citation, all in order 
to expose clearly the banality of narrative.  
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